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Given a common technology for replicating blueprints, high-quality blueprints will be replicated
more quickly than low-quality blueprints. If quality begets quality, and ﬁrms are identiﬁed with
collections of blueprints derived from the same initial blueprint, then, along a balanced growth path,
Gibrat’s Law holds for every type of ﬁrm. A ﬁrm size distribution with the thick right tail observed
in the data can then arise only when the number of blueprints in the economy grows over time, or
else ﬁrms cannot grow at a positive rate on average. But when calibrated to match the observed
ﬁrm entry rate and the right tail of the size distribution, this model implies that the median age
among ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees is about 750 years. The problem is Gibrat’s Law. If
the relative quality of a ﬁrm’s blueprints depreciates as the ﬁrm ages, then the ﬁrm’s growth rate
slows down over time. By allowing for rapid and noisy initial growth, this version of the model can
explain high observed entry rates, a thick-tailed size distribution, and the relatively young age of
large U.S. corporations.
Luttmer, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. An earlier version of this paper
circulated under the title “New Goods and the Size Distribution of Firms.” I have received useful comments
and suggestions from seminar participants at UCLA, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and the SED
and AEA meetings in Prague and New Orleans. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Iqwurgxfwlrq
Why does the employment size distribution of ﬁrms look like a Pareto distribution with
Pr[number of ﬁrm employees  n]  n3l and a tail index l  1.05, barely large enough
for the distribution to have a ﬁnite mean? Why are there so many large ﬁrms and how
did they grow so large?
In the presence of decreasing returns or downward sloping ﬁrm demand curves, it is
possible that the highly skewed size distribution entirely reﬂects a highly skewed pro-
ductivity distribution. Such a productivity distribution can arise from random ﬁrm-level
productivity growth, combined with selection of relatively productive ﬁrms. Random
growth implies a strict version of Gibrat’s law: ﬁrm growth rates are independent of
size. This is widely thought to be a reasonable ﬁrst approximation to the data. If
incumbent ﬁrms become more productive at an average rate that does not exceed the
productivity growth rate of new entrants, and unproductive ﬁrms are driven out of busi-
ness, then a stationary size distribution will result. This distribution will have a tail
index l just above 1 when there is only a small gap between entrant and incumbent
mean productivity growth rates (Luttmer [2007]).1
But is size really just productivity, and are mean growth rates really constant? At
the very least, it is likely to take time for a ﬁrm’s technological advances to be reﬂected
in its size. Figure I presents some striking evidence on ﬁrm growth rates. It shows the
employment histories of 25 large ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees in 2004. The
U.S. Census reports that there were close to a thousand such ﬁrms in 2004, and that
ﬁrms in this size class accounted for slightly over a quarter of U.S. employment. The
employment data reported in Figure I are from Compustat, ﬁlings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and company web sites.2 Included, for comparison, is an
artiﬁcial non-stochastic growth path for the Procter & Gamble Company that would
1The  =1asymptote is known as Zipf’s law. See Axtell [2001] for recent evidence on the ﬁrm
size distribution showing that  slightly above 1 ﬁts the data well. Well-known empirical studies on
Gibrat’s law for ﬁrms, based on growth rate regressions that correct for selection, are Evans [1987] and
Hall [1987]. Sutton [1997] surveys the literature. Gabaix [1999] uses Gibrat’s law to interpret the city
size distribution and contains many useful references on the history of the subject. Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright [2006] develop a model of the ﬁrm size distribution in which there are many industries and
the ﬁrm size in any given industry follows a stationary process, instead of the non-stationary process
implied by Gibrat.
2Davis et al. [2007] point out the di!culties associated with self-reported employment statistics such
as these. Chandler [1994, p. 137] shows a pattern very similar to Figure I for gross ﬁxed assets in the






























































































































































































































































2have resulted if employment at this company had grown, since its foundation in 1837,
at the U.S. population growth rate. The mean employment growth rate across all ﬁrms
reported in Figure I is a little over 18% per annum, and there is considerable variation.
In particular, ﬁrm growth rates seem to be persistently much above average when ﬁrms
are relatively small. And they decline signiﬁcantly when ﬁrms become large. Most of the
sample paths reported in this ﬁgure are unlikely to have been generated by the geometric
random walk implied by Gibrat’s law.3
This paper goes back to, interprets, and builds on the type of growth process initially
proposed by Yule [1925] and Simon [1955]. Yule [1925] was concerned with the number
of species in biological genera, and Simon [1955] with word frequencies, city sizes and
income distributions. Simon and Bonini [1958], Ijiri and Simon [1964], and many others
since studied ﬁrm growth. To generate a Pareto-like size distribution, these papers
rely on growth in the number of ﬁrms and a weak form of Gibrat’s law: mean growth
rates are independent of size. This is the starting point here as well, but then the
Gibrat assumption is relaxed to account for the evidence shown in Figure I, in a way
that continues to imply a stationary size distribution that matches the empirical size
distribution of U.S. ﬁrms. An explicit formula is obtained for the tail index l in terms
of the parameters of the growth process of ﬁrms.
In the model, ﬁrms produce dierentiated commodities using labor and commodity-
speciﬁc blueprints. An entrepreneur can set up a new ﬁrm by creating a blueprint of a
certain quality. Once set up, the ﬁrm can use labor and any of its blueprints to create
new blueprints of the same quality. Individual blueprints can also become obsolete. The
arrival rates of these two events are independent and independent across blueprints.
In the Gibrat version of the model, blueprints are of constant quality until the time
they become obsolete. As a result, the mean growth rate of a ﬁrm with more than a
single blueprint is independent of ﬁrm size. In this environment, ﬁrms with high-quality
blueprints have stronger incentives to replicate their blueprints, and hence grow faster,
than ﬁrms with low-quality blueprints.
Whether or not blueprints vary in quality, a setup like this can generate a ﬁrm size
distribution with a thick right tail, provided that the aggregate number of blueprints
grows at a strictly positive rate –equal to the population growth rate along the balanced
growth path– and some types of ﬁrms gain blueprints at almost this rate. If the
aggregate number of blueprints were constant, then the fact that there is entry would
3Besides Procter & Gamble, the only other ﬁrms in Figure I that were founded in the 19th century
are Abbott (1888), GM (1897), and IBM (1889).
3imply that incumbent ﬁrms must lose blueprints on average. When the mean growth
rate of ﬁrms is constant, this rate must be negative, and few ﬁrms can become very large.
The size distribution in Klette and Kortum [2004] has a thin right tail for precisely this
reason.
Calibrating an economy with homogeneous blueprints using the tail index l  1.05
and the observed ﬁrm entry rate of about 10% per annum implies that the median ﬁrm
with 10,000 or more employees is about 750 years old. In U.S. data, the median age of
such ﬁrms is about 75 years. Although the Procter & Gamble Company was not built in
a day, or even 75 years, it did not take 750 years. To capture this, it is assumed that a
ﬁrm’s blueprints can depreciate in quality without becoming completely obsolete. A new
ﬁrm enters as a high-quality ﬁrm with a high-quality blueprint. After some random time,
the quality of the ﬁrm and all of its blueprints reverts to “normal,” or low quality. As
a result, ﬁrms initially choose to grow faster than they will eventually, as appears to be
the case in Figure I. Depending on the shape of the replication technology, these growth
rate dierences can be large even for small dierences in blueprint quality. In contrast
to Luttmer [2007], bounded dierences in quality can lead to unbounded dierences in
ﬁrm size. Rapid initial growth is consistent with a stationary size distribution if the
mean duration of the initial growth phase is not too long. A relatively young population
of very large ﬁrms arises if ﬁrms tend to be large not because of long-term growth rates
that are close to the population growth rate, but because of the very rapid initial growth
of new ﬁrms. High observed entry rates imply that growth must be noisy, so that small
ﬁrms may exit with a high probability. Importantly, the calibrated regression of ﬁrm
growth rates on size is such that only small ﬁrms appear to violate Gibrat’s law.
Entry decisions and blueprint replication rates are endogenous in this paper, de-
pending ultimately on the talent distribution of entrepreneurs, the productivity of the
blueprint replication technologies, and the extent to which the replication of any sin-
gle blueprint is subject to decreasing returns. All agents can supply labor or develop
new blueprints, but talented agents have a comparative advantage in producing new
blueprints. If the entrepreneurial talent distribution has unbounded support, then some
entry will take place at any combination of wages and blueprint prices, and the balanced
growth path forces entry and replication rates to be such that the size distribution is
stationary.4 For simple cases, one can examine the dynamics away from the balanced
4In Luttmer [2007], incumbent growth rates are exogenous but a spillover makes the entry and
aggregate productivity growth rates endogenous. There, a weak spillover gives rise to a size distribution
with a thick right tail.
4growth path and conﬁrm that the balanced growth path is stable. The speed of adjust-
ment can be slow and depends on whether the number of blueprints is above or below
the balanced growth path.
As already indicated, this paper solves the thin-right-tail problem in Klette and
Kortum [2004]. It does so in an analytically tractable and inevitably stylized setup.
Lentz and Mortensen [2007] use a version of the Klette and Kortum [2004] economy
with additional and more ﬂexible sources of heterogeneity. They do not address the
thin-right-tail problem but estimate their model using panel data on Danish ﬁrms.5 The
Danish ﬁrm size data do not appear to exhibit the striking Pareto shape that is found
reliably in U.S. data. The small size of the Danish economy may well account for this–
there are as many ﬁrms in the U.S. as there are people in Denmark. When it comes
to examining the right tail of the size distribution, a model economy with a continuum
of ﬁrms could simply be a better abstraction for the U.S. than for a small country like
Denmark. In addition, small countries will have fewer very large ﬁrms if the replication
of blueprints across national boundaries or outside language areas comes at additional
costs.
Firms in this paper are organizations that operate in (monopolistically) competitive
markets and grow through continuous investment in new blueprints, at a level that is
proportional to the size of the ﬁrm. One can alternatively view a ﬁrm as a trading
post or network in which agents trade repeatedly. Gibrat’s law and the observed size
distribution arise if there is population growth and agents search for ﬁrms by randomly
sampling other agents and matching with the ﬁrm with which the agent sampled is
already matched. A simple version of such a model is described in Luttmer [2006].
Related models of network formation are presented in Jackson [2006] and Jackson and
Rogers [2007], and the extensive literature cited therein.
The economy is introduced in Section 2 and its balanced growth path is described
in Section 3, together with two alternative formulations of the role of blueprints in
production. The stationary size distribution is derived in Section 4 and formulas are
given for the tail index l in the Gibrat and non-Gibrat cases. Section 5 constructs the
age distribution conditional on size. These results are used in Section 6 to interpret age
and size data on U.S. ﬁrms. Section 7 concludes.
5See also Seker [2007] for related work on Chilean establishments.
52. Tkh Efrqrp|
Blueprints contain ideas and are costly to produce or replicate. In the baseline spec-
iﬁcation, a blueprint describes the idea for a ﬁnal good. Replication is never perfect,
implying that every good is dierent. Final goods producers are monopolistic com-
petitors. A competitive alternative in which blueprints specify plants that are subject
to decreasing returns is discussed later. The equilibria in both economies are Pareto
e!cient.
2.1 Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t 5 [0,4). There is a growing population of con-
sumers measured by Ht = He#t at time t. The dynastic preferences of the representative









The parameters #, 4 and  are positive and  =1is interpreted as logarithmic utility.
Markets are complete and consumers face standard budget constraints. The resulting
interest rate in consumption numeraire is







Consumption is a composite good that consists of a continuum of dierentiated com-
modities produced by producers who are of types taken from a countable set Z.T h e r e
is a measure Nz,t of producers of type z 5 Z, and all these producers charge the same
price pz,t in equilibrium. Aggregate consumption of a commodity trading at a price p is










with q < 1 restricted to also be positive so that consumers have a preference for variety.


















6Note that prices of dierentiated commodities are quoted in some arbitrary numeraire.
All other prices will be expressed in units of the composite commodity.
2.2 Producers





t (p), measured in units of composite consumption. The production of a dierenti-
ated commodity requires a blueprint. Given a type-z blueprint, a producer can use l units
of labor to produce zQtl units of its dierentiated commodity. The labor-augmenting
productivity component Qt is common to all producers and evolves exogenously accord-
ing to Qt = Qewt. One possible interpretation is that Qt is labor-augmenting human
capital that agents choose to accumulate at a constant rate. Alternatively, the model
can be expanded to include vintage equipment as a factor of production. Then Qt would
represent the average quality at time t of equipment used by commodity producers. In
either case, a commodity producer’s type z augments the productivity of inputs that
are used by all producers.












Measured in units of labor, this yields revenues lz,t,w h e r e =( 1 q)/q.A l lt y p e - z
producers charge the price pz,t implied by (3) and supply
Ct(pz,t)=zQtlz,t. (6)









Note that the elasticity of wages with respect to a proportional increase in all Nz,t is .
2.3 New Blueprints
At y p e - z producer needs a type-z blueprint to produce. Blueprints depreciate in one-
hoss-shay fashion at an average rate bz,t. New blueprints can be created by using labor
to replicate existing blueprints, or from scratch by entrepreneurs. The respective rates
at which this occurs in equilibrium are denoted by >z,t and Dz,t. The number of new
type-z blueprints therefore evolves according to
DNz,t =( Dz,t + >z,t  bz,t)Nz,t. (8)
7An initial condition determines Nz,0,f o re a c hz 5 Z.
2.3.1 Replication of Existing Blueprints
A new blueprint of type z can be created from an existing type-z blueprint. The new
blueprint arrives following an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean >z,t =
f(iz,t),w h e r eiz,t is labor employed in the replication process. An existing blueprint
is lost following an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean bz,t = g(jz,t),
where jz,t is labor used to “maintain” the blueprint. Note that an existing blueprint
generates revenues from its use in the production of a commodity, and as an input in
the production of new blueprints.6 The value vz,t of a type-z blueprint must satisfy the
Bellman equation
rtvz,t =m a x
>$f(i)
bDg(j)
{wt (lz,t  [i + j]) + (>  b)vz,t +D tvz,t},( 9 )
together with a transversality condition. The blueprint production function f is increas-
ing and exhibits strictly decreasing returns to scale. The blueprint depreciation function
g is assumed to be strictly decreasing and convex, and g(0) represents the rate at which
blueprints are lost without any eort. For convenience, both f and g are assumed to
su!ciently smooth with unbounded slopes near zero.7 The optimal investment in new
blueprints is determined by
>z,t = f(iz,t), bz,t = g(jz,t), vz,tDf(iz,t)=vz,tDg(jz,t)=wt.( 1 0 )
The technology assumptions ensure that >z,t and bz,t are increasing in vz,t. High-value
blueprints are replicated more quickly and maintained better than low-value blueprints.
2.3.2 New Designs by Entrepreneurs
New blueprints can also be designed from scratch by agents acting as entrepreneurs,
without the input of an existing blueprint. Not every new blueprint is of the most
6The model of how Wal-Mart has expanded since 1962 described in Holmes [2006] has this feature.
The key assumption here is that K-Mart cannot simultaneously look at a Wal-Mart blueprint to produce
a new blueprint of its own. As in Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2006], and unlike Luttmer [2007], spillovers
are assumed to be of secondary importance in this economy.
7The replication and maintenance technology is the same for all types of blueprints. It is conceptually
straightforward to allow for heterogeneity across types, and this could very well be an important source
of variation in ﬁrm growth rates.
8productive type because entrepreneurs must weigh the value of high-quality blueprints
against the cost of the time it takes to design them. At any point in time, every agent
in the economy is endowed with one unit of eort that can be assigned to various tasks:
supply labor, or attempt to produce a type-z blueprint for some z 5 Z. Every agent
has a skill vector (x,y),w h e r ex = {xz}zMZ are the rates at which the agent can develop
new blueprints of dierent types and y i st h ea m o u n to fl a b o rt h ea g e n tc a ns u p p l yp e r
unit of time. Given wages w and a vector of blueprint prices v = {vz}zMZ,d e ﬁ n e
Xz[v,w]=













Comparative advantage determines occupational choice. Ignoring ties, agents with a
skill vector in Xz[v,w] choose to be entrepreneurs who design type-z blueprints, and
agents with a skill vector in Y [v,w] will choose to be employees. Given prices (v,w),a n
agent with skill vector (x,y) earns max{(vzxz)zMZ,wy} per unit of time.
There is a time-invariant talent distribution T deﬁned over the set of all possible skill











Clearly, Ez(·) and L(·) are both homogeneous of degree 1, and the supply of every
activity is increasing in its own price –blueprint price or wage– and decreasing in
all other prices. As in the discrete-choice problem of McFadden [1974] and the trade
model of Eaton and Kortum [2002], suppose skills are independent Fréchet, T(x,y)=
exp(
S
zMZ(xz/1z)3j (y/1y)3j). Then the supplies of entrepreneurial eort (11) and
labor (12) equal K(1  1/j) times 1z(1zvz,t/D[vt,w t])j31 and 1y(1ywt/D[vt,w t])j31,r e -






Given a per-capita supply of entrepreneurial eort Ez(vt,w t) and a stock of type-z blue-
prints Nz,t,t h er a t eDz,t at which entrepreneurs add new type-z blueprints is determined
9by
Dz,tNz,t = HtEz(vt,w t) (13)
for each z 5 Z. Labor market clearing requires that
[
zMZ
Nz,t(lz,t + iz,t + jz,t)=HtL(vt,w t). (14)
The equilibrium is determined by (1)-(14), initial conditions {Nz,0}zMZ, and transversal-
ity conditions for {vz,tNz,t}zMZ.
Because the product market distortion arising from monopolistic competition is the
same in all markets and at all times, and because agents supply their time inelastically,
it turns out that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto e!cient. If there is only one type
of blueprint, then it is possible to characterize the dynamics in terms of only one state
and one costate variable, and construct an equilibrium that converges over time to a
balanced growth path.8
3. Bdodqfhg Gurzwk dqg Aowhuqdwlyh Frupxodwlrqv
Along a balanced growth path, the measure of blueprints of every type grows at the rate
#,a n dt h u sNz,t = Nze#t for some Nz. The allocation of labor per type-z blueprint is
constant at (iz,j z,l z). Because of (2), (6) and (7), per capita consumption and wages
grow at the rate V = w + #. The implied interest rate is r = 4 + V.U s i n g ( 5 ) ,
production labor per type-z blueprint can be written as
lz = z
1/l, z 5 Z, (15)
for some positive l. The resulting revenues per blueprint are necessarily positive and
hence blueprint prices will be positive. The Bellman equation (9) implies that wages




lz  [iz + jz]
r  V  [>z  bz]
,z 5 Z,( 1 6 )






















, z 5 Z.( 1 7 )
8The rate at which blueprint capital is accumulated in this economy depends intricately on the shape
of the production and depreciation functions f and g, and the shape of the talent distribution. It is
possible to generate slow and asymmetric adjustment to the balanced growth path. A detailed analysis
is beyond the scope of this paper.
10Since positive revenues net of replication and maintenance costs are feasible, (16) must
hold with lz >i z + jz and r  V > >z  bz. The fact that the aggregate number of
blueprints grows at the rate # implies that entrepreneurs must contribute new blueprints
at the non-negative rate #  [>z  bz].I fEz(v,w) is positive, then the entrepreneurial





#  [>z  bz]
, z 5 Z.( 1 8 )
Alternatively, Ez(v,w)=0and (#  [>z  bz])Nz/H =0 . A l o n gab a l a n c e dg r o w t h





(iz + jz + lz)=L(v,w).( 1 9 )
Given some positive scale factor l, the balanced growth conditions (15)-(17) determine
the blueprint prices vz/w, the labor allocations (iz,j z,l z), and the resulting accumulation
rates >z and bz. The supply of blueprints (18) and the labor-market clearing condition
(19) then pin down the level of l. Note that these equilibrium conditions only depend
on blueprint prices relative to wages. The level of wages follows from (7) and (18).
Aggregate consumption can be obtained from (5).
The present value of aggregate consumption must be ﬁnite, and this requires pa-
rameter values so that r>V + #. Since the number of blueprints grows at the rate
# along any balanced growth path, replication of existing blueprints can contribute at
ar a t eo fa tm o s t>z  bz  #, and this will hold for all small enough iz and jz as
long as # >f (0)  g(0). Together, these inequalities imply r  V > >z  bz for all
z 5 Z, and this ensures ﬁnite present values. The optimality of iz and jz implies that
(r  V)vz/w  lz  [iz + jz]+[ >z  bz]vz/w for any z 5 Z,a n dt h u s
(r  V  [>z  bz])(vz  vz)/w  (lz  lz)
for any two z and z in Z.T h i si m p l i e st h a tvz/w is increasing in z,s i n c elz is increasing
in z, by (15). The assumption that f and g are concave then implies the same for >z
and bz. A similar argument implies that the blueprint prices vz/w that satisfy (15)-
(17) are increasing in l. In turn, the entrepreneurial supply of blueprints is increasing in
blueprint prices. The left-hand side of (19), taking into account (15)-(18), is therefore
increasing in l. In particular, the demand for labor grows without bound as l increases
t oap o i n tw h e r e>z  bz approaches # for the most productive blueprint. The supply
of labor on the right-hand side (19) is decreasing in l, again taking into account how
11blueprint prices depend on l via (15)-(17). Together these observations can be used to
prove the following.
Pursrvlwlrq 1 Suppose that 4 + V > V + # and # >f (0)  g(0).T a k e t h e s e t
of blueprint types Z to be ﬁnite and suppose that the talent distribution is such that
Ez(v,w) > 0 for all z 5 Z and all strictly positive (v,w). Then (15)-(19) deﬁnes a
unique balanced growth path that satisﬁes # > >z  bz for all z 5 Z. The employment
levels iz, jz and lz as well as the accumulation rates >z and bz are increasing in z.
The assumption that Z is ﬁnite is the simplest way to ensure that there is a most
productive type of blueprint. Together with Ez(v,w) > 0 this then implies that the
#[>zbz] are positive and bounded away from zero. An equilibrium with Ez(v,w)=0 ,
possibly for all z 5 Z, can arise if the talent distribution has bounded support. In such
an equilibrium, new blueprints are only produced using replication from an initial stock
of blueprints. Since #  [>z  bz] is decreasing in z, it must then be that Nz > 0 and
# = >z  bz for the most productive blueprint, and Nz =0and # > >z  bz for all
other blueprints. These possibilities are ruled out in Proposition 1 by assuming that the
entrepreneurial supply of blueprints is strictly positive at all positive blueprint prices.
3.1 The Blueprint Productivity Distribution
The distribution of productivities across blueprints is determined by (18), and this is
well deﬁned because # > >z  bz.L o w - z blueprints may be prevalent in the economy,
despite the fact that vz/w is low, simply because many agents in the economy have the
skill to introduce low-z blueprints. But high-z blueprints have the advantage that they
will be replicated at a higher rate. Especially if >z  bz is close to #, this can easily
swamp the fact that entrepreneurs introduce high-z blueprints relatively infrequently.
In such a situation, the distribution of productivities can have most of its mass near the
upper end of Z.
3.2 Alternative Blueprint Interpretations
In the setup considered so far, dierent blueprints specify distinct dierentiated com-
modities that are produced subject to constant returns and are sold to all consumers.
The equilibrium conditions for this economy also apply to an economy in which con-
sumers live in many dierent locations and blueprints are location speciﬁc. With minor
modiﬁcations, the same framework can be used as well to consider competitive ﬁnal
goods markets and blueprints containing the speciﬁcations for production facilities or
12plants that are subject to decreasing returns. The following elaborates on these two
interpretations. They are benchmarks. Hybrid formulations are more plausible, but also
less tractable.
3.2.1 Sales O!ces or Stores
Suppose that at any point in time, consumers are evenly distributed across many loca-
tions. In each location, there are many consumers who can only buy from local stores.
Preferences are as in (2), with Nz,t now denoting the measure of type-z stores in a
particular location. An entrepreneur can create a blueprint for a store in a randomly
selected location. The store sells a new dierentiated product. The blueprint can then
be copied to operate stores selling the same dierentiated product in randomly selected
new locations. There is an economy-wide market for labor services, or, equivalently,
output is produced where workers live and can be shipped to stores at no cost.
Because there are many locations, replicated blueprints are always assigned to new
locations, and every new store sells a commodity that is new to the market in which it
is introduced. Assuming there is a very large number of blueprints that can be copied,
every location receives a constant ﬂow of new stores, and stores are uniformly distributed
across locations. As a result, new stores face the same market conditions everywhere.9
With this, the analysis proceeds as before.
3.2.2 Production Facilities or Plants
Instead of assuming that the output of every producer is unique, suppose there is one
competitive market for ﬁnal goods. Blueprints are needed to operate plants that are
subject to decreasing returns, and growth in variety is no longer a source of consumption
growth. Each plant can use lt units of labor to produce output yt =( zQtlt)k for some
k 5 (0,1). The optimal scale of a type-z plant is lz,t =( k/wt)(kzQt/wt)k/(13k) units of
labor. Along a balanced growth path, employment per plant is constant and the number
of plants grows at the population growth rate #. It follows that wages grow at the rate
9There must be many more stores than locations. Imagine markets are non-overlapping intervals
of length 1/A in [0,1],w h e r eA 5 N. Each one of the A markets has $A consumers and there are
A2 stores that are randomly assigned to points in [0,1]. The ratio of stores to consumers is /$.
As A becomes large, the proportion of all stores assigned to the region [0,x] converges to x.I f t h e
number of stores were A instead, then the number of stores in dierent markets would remain random
and converge to a Poisson distribution. Market conditions would vary across locations, and strategic
considerations would come into play in each market.
13V = kw, reﬂecting the growth rate w of the per-capita eective labor supply, and the
fact that plants are subject to decreasing returns. In contrast to the standard one-sector
growth model, the cost of producing new capital rises with wages. Blueprints become
more and more expensive to produce or replicate as labor becomes more e!cient at
operating plants. As a result, the capital stock, measured in numbers of blueprints, does
not increase fast enough to allow wages to grow at the rate w. Of course, the market
value of the per-capita stock of capital does grow at the same rate as wages and output.
4. Tkh Sl}h Dlvwulexwlrq ri Flupv
The economy described up to now has agents who consume, supply labor, or act as
entrepreneurs. Everyone can own blueprints and there are no ﬁrms. In this section, a
transaction cost argument is used to motivate a deﬁnition of what ﬁrms are.
4.1 Transaction Costs
Consider an entrepreneur who has just developed a new blueprint. To hire labor to
produce the associated commodity and develop further copies of the same blueprint, the
entrepreneur can set up a ﬁrm at no cost. This deﬁnes a ﬁrm entry. Claims to ﬁrms
can be traded freely. But there is a potentially very small cost involved in ﬁrms hiring
entrepreneurs to develop new blueprints from scratch, in selling blueprints to ﬁrms, and
in merging ﬁrms. There are no cost advantages to any of these transactions, and so they
will not occur in equilibrium.10
A ﬁrm will therefore only gain new commodities through its use of the technology for
replicating its existing blueprints. A ﬁrm only loses commodities as its blueprints become
obsolete.11 A ﬁrm that has lost all its commodities is shut down. In this environment,
ﬁrms dier only by the number of commodities they produce, and this number can be
used to measure the size of a ﬁrm. In the following, the distribution of ﬁrm size is
derived assuming that the economy is on a balanced growth path.
10Of course these transactions do occur in the data. This is a familiar and important failure of the
type of model described in this paper. Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg [2006] provide an interesting
model of ﬁrm size in which adverse selection makes it di!cult for ﬁrms to hire entrepreneurs.
11Bernard, Redding and Schott [2006] document the importance of turnover in the mix of products
sold by U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. They report that less than 1% of product adds and drops are
associated with mergers or aquisitions.
144.2 Mechanics
For notational simplicity, assume there is only one type of blueprint, and drop the type
index z. The measure of ﬁrms with n commodities at time t is denoted by Mn,t.S i n c e





Over time, the change in the number of ﬁrms with one commodity is
DM1,t = b2M2,t + DNt  (b + >)M1,t. (21)
where >, b,a n dD = #(>b) are equilibrium rates that are constant along the balanced
growth path. The number of ﬁrms with one commodity increases because ﬁrms with
two commodities lose one, or because of entry. The number declines because ﬁrms with
one commodity gain or lose a commodity. Similarly, the numbers of ﬁrms with more
than one commodity evolve according to
DMn,t = b(n +1 ) Mn+1,t + >(n  1)Mn31,t  (b + >)nMn,t, (22)
for all n1 5 N.T h ej o i n td y n a m i c so fNt and {Mn,t}"
n=1 is fully described by (20)-(22).
4.3 The Stationary Size Distribution
Along the balanced growth path, Nt grows at the rate # and a stationary ﬁrm size
distribution exists if (20)-(22) has a solution that satisﬁes DMn,t = #Mn,t for all n 5 N.




for all n 5 N. This is the fraction of ﬁrms that produce n commodities. Analytically





for all n 5 N. The mean number of commodities per ﬁrm can be written in terms of the


















15The numerator of the left-hand side adds up to the total measure of commodities in the
economy. This is ﬁnite at all times. Hence the mean ﬁrm size is well deﬁned and ﬁnite
by construction.





Given D = #  (>  b) and the deﬁnition of {Qn}"
n=1,( 2 1 )c a nn o wb ew r i t t e na s
#Q1 = bQ2 + #  (>  b)  (b + >)Q1, (24)
and (22) implies that
1
n
#Qn = bQn+1 + >Qn31  (b + >)Qn, (25)
for n1 5 N.A n ys e q u e n c e{Qn}"
n=1  [0,1] that satisﬁes (23)-(25) deﬁnes a stationary
size distribution {Pn}"
n=1 via Qn 2 Pn/n. Note that the equations (23)-(25) only depend
on the parameters >/b and #/b–the stationary distribution does not depend on the
units in which time is measured.












 n = 1
λ/μ
Fljxuh II. T h eD y n a m i c so f{qn}"
n=1.
Equation (25) is a second-order dierence equation in {Qn}"
n=1.I tc o m e sw i t ht w o
boundary conditions, (23) and (24). To solve this system, it is convenient to introduce
16as e q u e n c e{qn}"























[#  (>  b)] (28)







for all n  1 5 N. The recursion (27) is depicted in Figure II for the case > > b.
Note in particular that the curve deﬁned by (27) shifts upwards as n increases. Using
this observation one can verify that {qn}"
n=1 converges monotonically from q1 =0to
min{1,b/>}.
The sequence {Zn}"
n=2 is completely determined by (28)-(29). Observe from (26)
that Qn = qn+1(Qn+1 + Zn+1). The boundary condition (23) together with the fact
that qn  1 implies that QK
TK
k=1 qk must converge to zero as K becomes large. Thus
one can iterate forward to obtain the solution for {Qn}"
n=1. The following proposition
presents this solution and provides upper and lower bounds for Qn when n is large.
Pursrvlwlrq 2 Suppose that >, b, # and D = #  (>  b) are positive. Deﬁne the
sequence {qn}"
n=1 by the recursion (27) and the initial condition q1 =0 . This sequence


















Take any 0 > 0.I f> > b then
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for all large enough n.I f> < b then
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17for all large enough n.
The proof is in Appendix C. The distribution {Pn}"
n=1 follows immediately from Pn 2
Qn/n.
4.4 The Right Tail







for large n.W h e nb > >, the properties of this product are quite die r e n tf r o mw h a tt h e y
are when > < b.I fb > >,t h e nQn is bounded above by a multiple of the geometrically
declining sequence (>/b)n. On the other hand, if > > b then >qn/b % 1, and hence
the right-hand side of (33) declines at a rate that is slower than any given geometric
rate. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that the right-hand side of (33) is nevertheless
summable. The following proposition gives a further characterization of the right tail of
the distribution.
Pursrvlwlrq 3 Suppose that # > 0, > > b and # > >  b.T h e n t h e r i g h t t a i l








for any a smaller than the tail index l = #/(>  b).







 c  l ln(K) (34)
for some constant c. The limiting tail index l =1associated with Zipf’s law arises when
the entry rate D = #  (>  b) converges to zero.
For comparison, consider the economy of Klette and Kortum [2004]. There, # =0
and > < b. The resulting ﬁrm size distribution is R.A. Fisher’s logarithmic series
distribution, which has Pn 2 (>/b)
n /n. As a result, right tail probabilities converge
to zero even more quickly than a geometric sequence. To generate a thick right tail,
ﬁrms must grow on average, and in the economy described here this requires population
18growth. A tail index l close to 1 can only arise if growth in the number of blueprints
is mostly due to incumbents rather than new entrants. It is critical that ﬁrms grow
exponentially. If ﬁrms accumulate new blueprints at some constant rate >,i n s t e a do f
>n, then the size distribution would be Poisson-like, with a geometrically bounded right
tail.
The inﬁnite sum (30) is hard to compute accurately when l is close to 1.T h e
computations below make use of the recursion Qn = qn+1(Qn+1 + Zn+1) and the bound
(31) for large n.
4.5 Firm Entry and Exit Rates
The ﬂow of blueprints introduced by new ﬁrms is DNt. Each new ﬁrm starts with one
blueprint, and so DNt is also the ﬂow of new ﬁrms that enters per unit of time. The ﬁrm
entry rate as a fraction of the number of incumbent ﬁrms, denoted by , is therefore equal
to DNt divided by the number of ﬁrms in the economy,
S"
n=1 Mn,t = Nt/
S"
n=1 nPn.A n
alternative way to calculate the ﬁrm entry rate  is to note that the only ﬁrms that can
exit in this economy are ﬁrms with one remaining blueprint. The proportion of such
ﬁrms is P1, and they exit at a rate b. The resulting balance   bP1 of ﬁrms entering
a n de x i t i n gp e ru n i to ft i m em u s te q u a lt h er a t e# at which the number of ﬁrms grows




nPn = # + bP1. (35)
Clearly, the ﬁrm entry rate can be no less than the population growth rate, and this
lower bound is attained only when ﬁrms never lose blueprints and therefore never exit.
T h et w oe q u a t i o n sg i v e ni n( 3 5 )a n dQ1 = P1/
S"
n=1 nPn imply /# =1 /(1(b/D)Q1).
Together with (30) this yields an explicit formula for the ﬁrm entry rate relative to the
population growth rate. In turn this implies an explicit formula for the mean ﬁrm size
/D.
4.6 A Convenient Limiting Case
Suppose # and b are bounded away from zero and let >b approach # from below so that
the rate D at which blueprints are introduced by entrepreneurs goes to zero. Observe
that this is exactly when the tail index l = #/(>b) approaches one from above. In the
limit, the recursion (25) for Qn 2 nPn can be written as Pn = b






Xn for all n  1 5 N.T h i si m p l i e sXn+1 =( 2 /[n(n +1 ) ] ) X2 for all
19n 5 N.I t e r a t i n gf o r w a r do nt h er e c u r s i o nf o rPn and requiring the resulting Pn to add
































by the dominated convergence theorem (see Appendix B.) Thus the right tail probabili-
ties behave like 1/K, and the log right tail probabilities expressed as a function of ln(K)
must asymptote to a straight line with slope 1.
A tt h es a m et i m ea st h er a t eD at which blueprints are introduced by entrepreneurs
goes to zero, the average number of blueprints per ﬁrm goes to inﬁnity. But the entry
rate of new ﬁrms satisﬁes  = # + bP1, and this converges to a positive value. A







In situations when most blueprints are created by incumbent ﬁrms, this allows one to
infer >/# and b/# = 1+>/# simply from the ratio of the ﬁrm entry rate over the
population growth rate /#.
4.7 Heterogeneous Blueprint Qualities and Gibrat’s Law
A ﬁrm is deﬁned as the collection of blueprints produced by replication from some initial
blueprint. Replication produces blueprints of the same quality and so one can take the
type of a ﬁrm to be the uniform quality of its blueprints. Propositions 2 and 3 then
apply to ﬁrms of the same type.
Along the balanced growth path, ﬁrm growth rates satisfy Gibrat’s law conditional
on type, and the size distribution of type-z ﬁrms will have a tail index #/(>zbz).S i n c e
high-type blueprints are replicated more quickly than low-type blueprints, this implies a
thicker right tail for the distribution of high-type ﬁrms. The right tail of the overall size
distribution will inherit the tail index of the highest ﬁrm type, which corresponds to the
lowest #/(>z bz). Most ﬁrms far out in the right tail of the distribution will be high-z
ﬁrms. Since these are the ﬁrms with the highest mean growth rate in the economy, this
induces a positive association between ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth rates.
20Most empirical studies suggest that Gibrat’s law is violated in the other direction:
small ﬁrms tend to have higher growth rates than medium or large ﬁrms; see Evans
[1987], Hall [1987], Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1989], and the survey of Sutton
[1997]. At the root of the problem is the assumption that ﬁrms have one type of blueprint
and that this type is permanent. As a consequence, mean growth rates are permanently
dierent across ﬁrms. The data shown in Figure I suggest, instead, that ﬁrms initially
grow at rates that far exceed the restriction >z  bz < # implied by Proposition 1, and
that these growth rates decline as ﬁrms age.
4.8 Firm Type Transitions
A simple way to account for this slow-down in ﬁrm growth rates and to examine its
implications for the stationary size distribution is as follows. Suppose that Z = {zL,z H}
for some zL <z H, and that new ﬁrms enter as type-zH ﬁrms and then transition to type-
zL ﬁrms following independent and exponentially distributed waiting times with mean
1/B. When such transitions happen, all blueprints of a ﬁrm turn into type-zL blueprints,
permanently. Any new blueprints created by the ﬁrm thereafter will be of type zL.
The incentives to invest continue to be determined by (17) along a balanced growth
path. But the present-value condition for blueprint values (16) in the initial phase must
be modiﬁed to account for the loss in value that occurs when a blueprint transitions










r  V  [>zH  bzH]
.
In the terminal phase, vzL/w continues to satisfy (16). Along the balanced growth path,
the number of type-zH blueprints is NzH/H = EzH(v,w)/(# + B  [>zH  bzH]).T y p e -
zL blueprints are created by replication and because a ﬂow BNzH of type-zH blueprints
depreciate in quality. The resulting number of type-zL blueprints is therefore NzL/H =
B(NzH/H) /(#[>zLbzL]). Given this, the labor market clearing condition (19) becomes
EzH(v,w)
# + B  [>zH  bzH]

lzH + izH +
B[lzL + izL]
#  [>zL  bzL]

= L(v,w).
If the talent distribution for entrepreneurs is unbounded, EzH(v,w) is positive at all
positive prices. This then implies that # + B > >zH  bzH and # > >zL  bzL in equilib-
rium. Using the ﬁrst of these inequalities together with r  V > # one can apply the
same argument as before to show that optimality implies that izH >i zL and jzH >j zL.
While their quality advantage lasts, type-zH ﬁrms have stronger incentives to invest in
21replicating blueprints than type-zL ﬁrms. They lose blueprints at a lower rate and gain
new ones at a higher rate. Firms grow faster in the initial phase.
Pursrvlwlrq 4 Suppose ﬁrms enter with productivity zH and transition to productivity
zL <z H at a positive rate B. Then, along the balanced growth path, >zH  >zL,
bzH < bzL, # + B > >zH  bzH and # > >zL  bzL. The stationary size distribution has a























The right tail of the size distribution declines geometrically otherwise.
The fact that the technology implies >zH  bzH  >zL  bzL is used in the statement
of this proposition but plays no role in determining the tail index. The actual size
distribution and a proof of Proposition 4 are in Appendix E. If l = #/(>zL  bzL) then
the fact that all ﬁrms eventually grow at a rate that is close to the population growth
rate accounts for the thick right tail observed in the ﬁrm size distribution. Alternatively,
if l =( # + B)/(>zH  bzH), then large ﬁrms arise because of the rapid growth of new
ﬁrms. This can generate a thick tail even if there is no population growth. In an extreme
example, one can set B slightly above >zH  bzH and make both arbitrarily large. New
ﬁrms then either exit or become large almost instantaneously.
One possible interpretation for the ﬁrm type transitions discussed here is that some
aspect of the environment for which the initial blueprint of a ﬁrm was created has
changed permanently.12 Of course, such changes could take place more gradually than
described here. An alternative interpretation for the decline in ﬁrm growth rates is that
blueprints are location-speciﬁc and that ﬁrms initially implement blueprints in the most
proﬁtable locations.
12Atkeson and Kehoe [2006] interpret the observed slow-down in ﬁrm growth rates by assuming that
ﬁrm productivity growth rates decline with age. Here the interpretation is a decline in the level of
productivity relative to everyone else. A plausible cause for such a decline is competing ﬁrms catching
up with a ﬁrm’s initial innovation. Although the economics is quite clear, describing this in a way that
yields an analytically tractable growth process is more challenging.
225. Flup Ajh dqg Sl}h
The early histories of large ﬁrms are often known in some detail. This makes the age
distribution among large ﬁrms a useful tool for assessing alternative interpretations of
the ﬁrm size distribution. This section derives this distribution and the next will use it
to show that Gibrat’s law is inconsistent with the data.
5.1 The Size Distribution of a Cohort
Consider a cohort of ﬁrms that enter at the same time, not necessarily with a single
blueprint. As in Section 4, suppose these ﬁrms are initially in a “phase one” in which
they gain and lose blueprints at certain rates. Firms that have not exited transition into
a “phase two” following an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean 1/B.L e t
s31(a) denote the fraction of ﬁrms in the cohort that have made this transition by age
a and deﬁne sn(a) to be fraction of all cohort ﬁrms that are in phase one and have n
goods. In phase one, ﬁrms with n goods gain new goods at a rate >n and lose existing
goods at a rate bn. In particular, ﬁrms that lose their last good will remain zero-good
ﬁrms forever–they exit. Since only ﬁrms in phase one that have not yet exited can
transition into phase two,
Ds31(a)=B[1  s31(a)  s0(a)]. (37)
Exits occur when ﬁrms lose their last good, and hence
Ds0(a)=bs1(a). (38)
The number of ﬁrms of a cohort that are still in phase one and that have n goods by
age a must satisfy
Dsn(a)=( n  1)>sn31(a)+( n +1 ) bsn+1(a)  [B +( > + b)n]sn(a) (39)
for all n 5 N.N o t et h a tt h eBsn(a) term is not scaled by n, reﬂecting the assumption
that the transition probability from phase one to phase two is independent of size. The
probability distribution {sn(a)}"
n=31 is determined by (37)-(39) and an initial condition
for the size distribution of a cohort at entry.
Pursrvlwlrq 5 For any > > 0 and b  0 deﬁne (a)=( e(>3b)a  1)/(e(>3b)a  b/>).























































for all n 5 N.T h e n sn(a)=Tn,k(a) solves (37)-(39) for the initial condition given by
s1(0) = k and sn(0) = 0 otherwise.
For B =0and k =1this solution can be found and Klette and Kortum [2004]. The
probability generating function for B =0and k 5 N is in Kendall [1948]. Using the
fact that (a) goes to zero as age goes to zero one can verify that Tk,k(a) % 1 as age
goes to zero. The solution for T0,k(a) follows directly from T1,k(a) and integrating (38).
Summing Tn,k(a) over all n 5 N gives 1T31,k(0)T0,k(0) = e3Ba(1[(b)b/>]k) and then
T31,k(0) follows from integrating (37). The proof of Proposition 5 can be completed by
computing the derivative of Tn,k(a) and checking (39) for any n 5 N.A p p e n d i xFg i v e s
a more constructive proof based on the observation that, conditional on no transition
from phase one to phase two, a ﬁrm with n goods gains and loses goods with the same
probabilities as does the aggregate of n independent ﬁrms with one good each.
Suppose B =0 .I f> < b then ﬁrms decrease in size on average and T0,k(a) $ 1 as
the age of a cohort grows without bound. After a long time, virtually all of a cohort of
ﬁrms will have exited the economy. On the other hand, if > > b,t h e nT0,k(a) $ b/>.
Af r a c t i o n1  b/> o fa n yc o h o r to fﬁ r m ss u r v i v e sa n dg r o w sf o r e v e r ,g i v i n gr i s et oa
thick-tailed size distribution.
5.2 Age Given Size
Now consider the setup of Proposition 4: a cohort of ﬁrms initially produces goods with
a blueprint quality zH, and that this quality depreciates permanently to zL following
an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean 1/B.W r i t eTH,n,k(a) and TL,n,k(a)
for the solutions to (37)-(39) associated with (>zH,bzH,B) and (>zL,bzL,0), respectively.
Then the cohort size distribution {pn(a)}"










24for all n +15 N. The inﬁnite sum on the right-hand side of (40) can be calculated
explicitly, as reported in Appendix F. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (40) ac-
counts for the ﬁrms that are still in the initial growth phase. The second term represents
ﬁrms that have transitioned into the second phase by age a.A ﬂ o w BTH,k,1(a  b) of
ﬁrms in the initial growth phase transition into the second phase at age a  b.A d d i n g
up over all ages and accounting for their subsequent growth gives the second term. Note
well that (40) includes n =0 , and so the sum of pn(a) over all n 5 N gives the fraction
of ﬁrms that have survived up to age a.
Along a balanced growth path, the measure of new ﬁrms entering is growing at a
rate #. Consider the population of all ﬁrms that have entered up to a particular point
in time, including those that have since exited. The exponential rate # at which entry
cohort sizes grow implies an exponential age distribution 1  e3#a for this population.
Because {pn(a)}"
n=0 includes ﬁrms that have exited, the joint distribution of age and size
is #e3#apn(a) among all ﬁrms that have ever entered. The age density among all ﬁrms









In particular, for N =1this deﬁnes the age density among all surviving ﬁrms.
6. U.S. Epsor|hu Flupv
U.S. Internal Revenue Service statistics contain more than 26 million corporations, part-
nerships and non-farm proprietorships. Business statistics collected by the U.S. Census
consist of both non-employer ﬁrms and employer ﬁrms. In 2002 there were more than
17 million non-employer ﬁrms, many with very small receipts, and close to 6 million
employer ﬁrms.
In the following, Census data on employer ﬁrms assembled by the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) will be considered. For employer ﬁrms, part-time employees are
included in employee counts, as are executives. But proprietors and partners of unincor-
porated businesses are not (Armington [1998, p.9]). This is likely to create signiﬁcant
biases in measured employment for small ﬁrms. The SBA reports ﬁrm counts for 24
size categories, ranging from 1 to 4 employees to 10,000 and more employees, as well as
the number of employer ﬁrms with no employment in March but some employment at
other times during the year. Over the 1990’s, SBA data show that the number of ﬁrms
grows roughly at the population growth rate of about 1% per annum, as predicted by
the model.
25Age data on ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees in 2006 are also used below. Two
measures of ﬁrm age are reported. One is based on the date a ﬁrm was incorporated.
Corporate restructuring can cause this measure of age to be much below the age of
the underlying organization that constitutes the ﬁrm. An alternative measure uses the
earliest date a ﬁrm or any of its components are known to have been in operation.
A more detailed description of how this data was collected is given in Appendix A.
Clearly, the complicated genealogy of many large corporations is not captured by the
models described in this paper.
6.1 Gibrat Implies 750 Year Old Firms
Panels (i) and (ii) of Figure III show the ﬁtted employment size distribution assuming
there is only one growth phase. The fractions #{ﬁrms with employment  n}/#{all
ﬁrms} and #{ﬁrms with employment  n}/#{all ﬁrms} o b s e r v e di nt h ed a t aa r ed i s -
played after merging the category of employer ﬁrms with no employment in March with
the category of 1 to 4 employees. The right-tail of the size distribution, shown in panel
(ii), is clearly well approximated by n3l, and the slope of the log tail probabilities with
respect to n is about l  1.05.N o t et h a tt h i se s t i m a t ed o e sn o td e p e n do nt h eu n i t si n
which ﬁrm employment is measured. U.S. population growth is around 1% per annum.
The formula for the tail index l = #/(>  b) then implies that ﬁrms grow at a rate
>  b = #/l  .95% per annum.
To decompose >  b, consider ﬁrst the Yule process obtained by setting b =0
and > = .0095. The only remaining free parameter is then the number of employees
per blueprint i + j + l. Changing this parameter causes parallel shifts in the curves
representing the model shown in panel (ii) of Figure III. The close ﬁt of the right tail
shown in panel (ii) is obtained by setting i + j + l =2 . Panel (i) shows that the left
tail is also well approximated. The stationary size distribution of a Yule process ﬁts
the empirical size distribution quite well. But this model of ﬁrm growth has deﬁciencies
that show up very clearly in dynamic data. The Yule process predicts a ﬁrm entry rate
 = # + bP1 = #, and this equals only about 1% per annum. Instead, the SBA reports
a ﬁrm entry rate of about 10% per annum over the 1990’s. Actual ﬁrms do decline and
exit, and entry rates are much higher than the population growth rate.
To match the evidence on ﬁrm entry along with the shape of the right tail of the size
distribution, one can raise > and b subject to the constraint >  b = #/l  .0095 until
the implied entry rate  reaches the .1 value observed in the data. Solving the l & 1









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28calculation for l =1 .05 gives > = .3695 and b = .36. Choosing the number of employees
per blueprint to match the right tail of the size distribution now gives i + j + l = .25.
T h ea s s o c i a t e dl e f ta n dr i g h tt a i l sa r ea g a i ns h o w ni np a n e l s( i )a n d( i i )o fF i g u r eI I I .
The increased transition probabilities > and b raise the variance (>+b)/n of the growth
rate of a ﬁrm with n blueprints, and this implies that surviving ﬁrms are more likely
to have many blueprints. Fitting the right tail of the employment distribution therefore
requires fewer employees per blueprint than in the case of a Yule process. But then the
left tail of the size distribution no longer ﬁts well. The higher variance cuts down, too
much, on the number of small ﬁrms–they either exit or grow large.
The age distributions displayed in the upper panel of Figure IV show a much more
dramatic failure of the one-phase model of ﬁrm growth. At > = .3695, b = .36 and
i + j + l = .25, the median age of ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees is about 750
years. The Yule process ﬁtted above implies a median large ﬁrm that is a couple of
centuries older still. In the data, the median age of these large ﬁrms is closer to 75
years. Given Gibrat’s law, ﬁrms all grow at the same average rate, and this must be
equal to >b = #/l  .0095. At this pace, it takes a very long time for a ﬁrm to grow
from its initial size of i+j +l = .25 employees to one with 10,000 employees–perhaps
not quite the ln(40,000)/.0095  1,115 years implied by deterministic growth, but still,
av e r yl o n gt i m e . 13
6.2 Rapid Initial Growth
As Figure I suggests, many large ﬁrms started out small and became large during rela-
tively short periods of rapid growth, at rates far exceeding the population growth rate.
This can account for the fact that the median large ﬁrm is only 75 years old. Proposition
4 indicates how this can also be made consistent with the observed right tail of the size
distribution. Firms can grow initially at a high rate >H  bH and then transition at a
rate B to a regime with a growth rate >L  bL that must be below #. If the tail index
is determined by the eects of initial rapid growth, then l =( # + B)/(>H  bH).G i v e n
l  1.05 and #  .01, this implies that >H  bH must be close to B. An initial phase
13The back-of-the-envelope age of 1,115 years can be reduced to 485 years by assuming that ﬁrms
enter with 100 employees and grow deterministically. This still implies large ﬁrms that are much too
old. In Luttmer [2007], Gibrat’s law holds in a strong form: both the mean and the variance of ﬁrm
growth rates are independent of size. The fact that the variance does not decrease with size makes it
easier for selection to produce large ﬁrms. But it takes annual growth rates with a standard deviation
as high as 40% per annum, implausibly high for all but the smallest ﬁrms, to account for the observed
age distribution of large ﬁrms.
29w i t hv e r yr a p i dg r o w t hi sp o s s i b l ea sl o n ga st h i sp h a s ei so fs u !ciently short average
duration. The fact that transition times are exponentially distributed implies that some
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Fljxuh V Growth by Size
Panels (iii) and (iv) of Figure III and the lower panel of Figure IV show the size and
age distributions when >H = .8575, >L = .5925,a n dbH = bL = .6,t o g e t h e rw i t hB = .25
and employee numbers per blueprint equal to iH +jH +lH = .30 and iL +jL +lL = .275.
These parameters give rise to a ﬁrm entry rate of 10% and a median age among ﬁrms
with more than 10,000 employees of 75 years. The parameters were chosen to match
these two features of the data, and to approximate the left and right tails of the size
distribution, subject to the theoretical restrictions implied by the model. Roughly, the
mean growth rates >H  bH and >L  bL are important for the median age, and the
variance parameters >H + bH and >L + bL are important for the entry rate. Increasing
>HbH lowers the median age while increasing >LbL causes the median age to rise as
ﬁrms that have become large stay around longer. Increases in >H+bH and >L+bL raise
the entry rate as ﬁrms spread out and exit more quickly. If iH +jH +lH and iL +jL +lL
are reduced along with these increases to keep the frequency of large ﬁrms in line with
the data, then the median age of large ﬁrms does not change much.
30The two-phase model introduces variation in mean growth rates that is correlated
with ﬁrm size. Figure V shows the mean and standard deviation of ﬁrm growth condi-
tional on size, with size measured by the number of blueprints employed by the ﬁrm.
A logarithmic scale is used to accentuate variation over the full range of the data. The
graph shows that beyond 300 blueprints, or about 100 employees, the implied mean ﬁrm
growth rate is essentially constant. This can explain why many researchers have found
that Gibrat’s law is a good approximation for ﬁrms that are not too small (e.g. Hall
[1987] and Evans [1987].) Small ﬁrms grow much faster on average, and the model also
predicts an intermediate size range in which ﬁrms are most likely to be in the low-growth
phase.
Over short intervals of time, the variance of ﬁrm growth in regime i is (>i + bi)/n
for a ﬁrm with n blueprints. The resulting estimated standard deviation of a ﬁrm with
n blueprints is about 1.21/
s
n in the high-growth phase and 1.09/
s
n in the low-growth
phase. A ﬁrm with 30 employees has around 100 blueprints, and hence the standard
deviation of its growth rate will be in the 10%  12% range. For ﬁrms with more than
10,000 employees, these standard deviations are on the order of .5% to .6%,n u m b e r s
that are small even relative to aggregate employment ﬂuctuations in the U.S. economy.
As emphasized by Klette and Kortum [2004], the empirical evidence suggests that the
variance of ﬁrm growth rates declines more slowly than 1/n. Hymer and Pashigian [1962]
compared standard deviations of ﬁrm growth rates across size quartiles and found that
ﬁrms in the largest quartile were signiﬁcantly more volatile than predicted by the 1/n
rule. More recently, Stanley et al [1996] and Sutton [2002] ﬁnd that the variance of the
growth rate of Compustat ﬁrms behaves like 1/n1/3. Tentative interpretations are given
in Stanley et al [1996] and Sutton [2002, 2007].
6.3 What Could Those Blueprints Be?
For the Yule process, i + j + l =2is the level of employment per blueprint that best
ﬁts the empirical employment size distribution. If > and b are increased to match the
observed ﬁrm entry rate, then employment per blueprint drops to i+j+l = .25. Similar
estimates of employment per blueprint are obtained if there is an initial growth phase.
Increasing employment per blueprint and increasing the variance of the ﬁrm growth
process both cause the stationary employment distribution to spread out. The observed
dispersion of employment therefore puts tight restrictions on employment per blueprint
and the variance of the ﬁrm growth process. If the employment per blueprint is high,
then the variance of the growth rate must be low, and vice versa. The Yule process has
31the lowest variance consistent with the observed tail index, and hence the highest level








































































































































































































Therefore, if the model is to ﬁt the distribution of all ﬁrms in the SBA collection
of ﬁrms, employment per blueprint can be at most 2. Such a low number rules out
several a priori plausible interpretations of what blueprints could be. Plants, organi-
zational departments, or geographically distinct subsidiaries typically have more than
two employees. Projects, tasks, sales accounts, or individual job descriptions might be
32better interpretations. Strictly within the model, blueprints are associated with dieren-
tiated commodities, and the small number of employees assigned to each dierentiated
commodity suggests an extremely dierentiated set of commodities.
Figure VI shows an alternative way to interpret part of the SBA data. The empirical
distribution displayed in this ﬁgure is the distribution of all ﬁrms with at least ﬁve
employees. That is, ﬁrms with 0 employees in March and those with 1-4 employees are
not included. Within the context of the model, one could interpret these small employer
ﬁrms as intermediaries that supply labor services to organizations that are classiﬁed as
ﬁrms–those that have more than ﬁve employees. Conditioning on ﬁrms with at least
ﬁve employees causes the log of the empirical right tail frequencies reported in panel
(ii) to shift up by a constant. This is what allows one to match the data with a larger
number of employees per blueprint. In Figure VI, this is taken to be the minimum size
of 5 employees. As before, B = .25  >H  bH,b u t>H + bH and >L + bL now have
to be smaller to match the right tail of the distribution. Panel (iii) shows that the
median large ﬁrm is now younger than the observed 75 years, while other percentiles are
above what is found in the data. The overall age distribution is still in the range of the
empirical age distribution.
7. Crqfoxvlrq
Data on U.S. ﬁrms show (i) a size distribution with many small ﬁrms and a very thick
right tail, (ii) high ﬁrm entry and exit rates, (iii) relatively young large ﬁrms, and (iv)
growth rate variances that decline with size more slowly than the inverse of ﬁrm size.
Luttmer [2007] and the current paper provide alternative interpretations of (i). Large
amounts of randomness or high transitory growth rates are required to account for (ii)
and (iii). The two models seem to be on opposite sides of the data when it comes to
(iv). In one case all shocks are ﬁrm-wide, while in the other independent within-ﬁrm
shocks average out. But neither model has industry or aggregate shocks. Evidence on
the slow decline of the variance of ﬁrm growth rates tends to come from sources, such as
Compustat, that do not include very small ﬁrms. It is possible that this misses a rapid
initial decline with size in the growth rate variance of these ﬁrms.
Skewed ﬁrm size distributions are interpreted as reﬂecting skewed productivity dis-
tributions in Hopenhayn [1992], Atkeson and Kehoe [2006], and Luttmer [2007], among
many others. The current paper attributes size dierences not only to productivity
dierences but also to stochastic variation in the number of markets in which a ﬁrm
operates, as in Klette and Kortum [2004], Lentz and Mortensen [2007], and Arkolakis
33[2007]. Bounded productivity dierences may give rise to unbounded size dierences.
In Lucas [1978], all variation in ﬁrm size is determined by heterogeneity in managerial
talent. In Holmes and Schmitz [1995], Gabaix and Landier [2008] and Tervi
..
o [2007],
both ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and managerial productivity play a role. Much remains
to be done to sort out the relative importance of each these aspects of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Figure I and the relative young age of large ﬁrms are interpreted here using a two-
phase pattern of growth in which all new ﬁrms start out with a high-quality blueprint
and become ﬁrms with all low-quality blueprints after some random time. This is an
abstraction that helps to illustrate the type of growth mechanism that can explain the
size and age distribution of large ﬁrms. One expects more gradual declines in relative
quality to work as well. Of course, not all new ﬁrms have high-quality blueprints. The
framework set out in this paper allows for heterogeneous quality in the blueprints of
start-up ﬁrms, and this can account for small ﬁrms that linger and never “take o.”
A natural extension would allow for start-up blueprints that are initially of uncertain
quality. This would bring in the selection considerations emphasized by Jovanovic [1982].
If blueprints are location speciﬁc, and locations are known to dier in how proﬁtable
they can be, then ﬁrms with new ideas will initially implement these in the more prof-
itable locations, and only then expand, at a slower pace, into less attractive locations.
T h i sc o u l db ea na l t e r n a t i v ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h eg r o w t hp a t t e r n ss h o w ni nF i g u r eI ,
although it remains to be seen how this can account for the observed size distribution.
One possibility is suggested by static models of Pareto-like size distributions. A well-
known example is the Beckmann [1958] model of hierarchies of cities. More recently,
Hsu [2007] describes an equilibrium model of hierarchies of ﬁrms and cities that produces
Zipf’s law. These static models could be viewed as long-run equilibrium conditions for
ad y n a m i ce c o n o m y ,a n dt h e nt h er a p i di n i t i a lg r o w t hs h o w ni nF i g u r eIw o u l ds i m p l y
reﬂect the fact that setting up a large ﬁrm is not quite instantaneous but still very fast.
A close examination of the early histories of large U.S. corporations, such as those
s h o w ni nF i g u r eIa n dt h eo n e sd e s c r i b e di nA p p e n d i xA ,s h o w st h a tm e r g e r s ,a c q u i -
sitions, and spin-os are by no means infrequent. Along the lines of Jovanovic and
Rousseau [2004], it is possible to interpret a small acquisition as the production of a new
blueprint, but other interpretations are perhaps more natural. Spin-os can give rise to
ﬁrms that enter with a relatively large initial size, instead of the common minimum size
assumed in this paper. It would be interesting to know how these aspects of ﬁrm growth
can be incorporated in a model of the size distribution. And of course, these phenomena
can shed light on what keeps the components of a ﬁrm together.
34AF lup Ajh Ddwd
The ﬁrm age data for large ﬁrms used in Section 7 is collected from several sources.
Large ﬁrms are taken to be all Compustat ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees,
about 600 companies, together with about 300 ﬁrms in that same size category that
appear on a list of large private companies published by Forbes magazine. For these
ﬁrms, two age measures were collected. One is the incorporation date obtained from
the Mergent data base. The second measure is the earliest reference to the company,
or any of its predecessor companies, that can be found in any of three dierent sources:
Mergent (formerly Moody’s manual), Dun and Bradstreet, and company web sites. A
predecessor company can be a company that was broken up into parts, or it can be a
component of the company that was initially independent. For ﬁrms that are in the
Mergent database, fairly extensive histories are reported, and these histories contain
information about predecessor companies. Company web sites of large corporations
often include extensive company histories that tend to emphasize the very old roots of
the company. The company age data together with the source for each age observation
a r ea v a i l a b l ea twww.luttmer.org.



























































Since # = >  b it follows that 1 = 1/ln(1  b/>)=1 /ln(>/#). The ﬁrm entry rate
is then












35which is the result reported in (36).
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Since qn  min{1,b/>} this implies the upper bounds in (31) and (32). Take some
0 > 0. The lower bounds rely on qn % min{1,b/>}.I f > > b, then eventually qn 
(b/>)/(1 + 0), and this gives the lower bound in (31). If > < b,t h e nqn  1/(1 + 0)
for all large enough n, and this implies (32). Thus the sums deﬁning {Qn}"
n=1 converge
and (31) and (32) hold. By construction, the candidate solution satisﬁes (24)-(25). It








for all n  1 5 N. Note from the bounds (31)-(32) that the sequence {Qn}"
n=1 is sum-
mable if and only if {Fn/n}"
n=1 is summable. This summability and Fn $ F" =0are

























Starting from X1 =1 , this converges monotonically to #/(>  b) > 1 if > > b.R a a b e ’ s
test then ensures that {Fn/n}"
n=1 is summable. The inequality Xn+1 > 1 is equivalent










for all K. Since the left-hand side is summable, it must be that F" =0 .
Write (24) as #Q1 = b[Q2  Q1]+#  (>  b)  >Q1 and (25) as
#Qn = bn[Qn+1  Qn]  >n[Qn  Qn31],




Qn = #  (>  b)+b
" [
n=1








Note that n[Qn+1  Qn]=( n +1 ) Qn+1  nQn  Qn+1 and n[Qn  Qn31]=nQn 
(n  1)Qn31  Qn31, and observe that F" =0ensures that the candidate solution (30)
satisﬁes limn<"nQn =0 . Using summation-by-parts for the two sums on the right-hand
side of (43) one obtains
" [
n=1






Qn.( 4 4 )
Together with # > >  b, (43) and (44) imply that the sequence {Qn}"
n=1 adds up to 1.
DP urri ri Pursrvlwlrq 3
Recall that Pn  Fn/n2 and deﬁne RK =
S"

























If the sum on the right-hand side is ﬁnite, then limK<" KaRK =0 .As u !cient condition










The recursion (27) for qn is equivalent to
























Observe that limn<" An =1 a. The limiting recursion for Yn is therefore






(Yn  [1  a]),
and this has the unique ﬁxed point Y" =1+l a. One can verify that Yn does indeed
converge to Y".T h u sa<l guarantees convergence.
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In this Appendix, write (>H,bH) for (>zH,bzH) and (>L,bL) for (>zL,bzL).
Let MH,n,t and ML,n,t denote the measures of ﬁrms with n blueprints in the high- and
low-growth regimes, respectively. As before, Nt =
S"
n=1 n(MH,n,t+ML,n,t) measures the
number of blueprints, and DNt is the ﬂow of blueprints introduced by new ﬁrms. The
evolution of MH,n,t is determined by the dierential equations (21) and (22), modiﬁed
to include an additional term BMH,n,t on the right-hand side. Note that this term is
not scaled by n, since the transition probability from high to low growth is assumed
to be independent of size. The dierential equations for ML,n,t a r e( 2 1 )a n d( 2 2 ) ,w i t h
an additional term +BMH,n,t on the right-hand side, and without the term DNt that
appears in (21). All entering ﬁrms are assumed to start out in the high-growth regime.
Starting from an initial condition {MH,n,0,M L,n,0}"
n=1, the resulting system of dierential
equations determines the joint distribution of ﬁrms by size and growth regime at all
times.
Along a balanced growth path, [MH,n,t,M L,n,t,N t]=e#t[MH,n,M L,n,N],w h e r e# is
the population growth rate. Given (>H,bH) and (>L,bL), the entry parameter D must be
such that the ﬂow of new commodities introduced by new and incumbent ﬁrms equals
#Nt.T h i si m p l i e s








is the fraction of all blueprints employed by ﬁrms in the high-growth phase. The steady
state distribution of blueprints by ﬁrm size is determined by k and the conditional
distributions QH,n 2 nMH,n and QL,n 2 nML,n.T h e d i erential equations for MH,n,t
and ML,n,t imply
(# + B)QH,1 = bHQH,2 +
D
k




(# + B)QH,n = bHQH,n+1 + >HQH,n31  (bH + >H)QH,n (47)
for all n  1 5 N,a sw e l la s













38for all n1 5 N. In addition, {QH,n}"
n=1 and {QL,n}"






QL,n =1 . (50)
The balanced growth distribution of blueprints across ﬁrms is now deﬁned by a fraction
k 5 (0,1), an entry parameter D > 0, and a non-negative sequence {QH,n,Q L,n}"
n=1 that
satisfy (45)-(50).
Observe that (46)-(47) and (50) exactly match the one-regime conditions (23)-(25)
with D and # replaced by D/k and # + B,r e s p e c t i v e l y .I tm u s tt h e r e f o r eb et h a tD/k =
# + B  (>H  bH). Combining this with (45) gives the solution for k and D,
k =
#  (>L  bL)




= # + B  (>H  bH).
The equilibrium conditions for a balanced growth path ensure k 5 (0,1) and D > 0.A s




















for all n 5 N. As in Proposition 2, qH,n % min{1,bH/>H} and qL,n % min{1,bL/>L}.
Proposition 2 and the solution for D/k then imply
QH,n =































for all n 5 N,s t a r t i n gf r o mZL,1 =0 . This last recursion and its initial condition
determine {ZL,n}"

























QH,l.( 5 2 )
The overall ﬁrm size distribution is determined by [kQH,n+(1k)QL,n]/n and (51)-(52).
T h er a t ea tw h i c ht h er i g h tt a i lo ft h i sd i s t r i b u t i o nd e c a y si sd e t e r m i n e db yt h e
slowest rate of decay of QH,n/n and QL,n/n. For the high-growth regime, Proposition 3
39shows that the size distribution has a tail index (#+B)/(>HbH) if >H > bH.I tr e m a i n s
to determine the properties of the right tail of QL,n/n.
























for all n 5 N.B yr e p l a c i n g1/l with 1/k and either keeping only the l =1term or only





















for I 5 {L,H} and some positive Q. Proposition 2 and its proof can be used to argue
that the inﬁnite sum on the right-hand side of this inequality is ﬁnite and bounded away
from zero. Deﬁne




























for some positive Q.N o t et h a t
Sk
l=1 1/l  1+ln(k). The inﬁnite sum converges because
ln(k)
Tk
m=1 jm is summable, which in turn follows because k0 Tk
m=1 jm is summable for
some small enough 0 > 0. This can be shown along the lines of the proof of Proposition
3.
These upper and lower bounds on QL,n imply that its tail behavior is determined
by
Tn
m=2 jm. This is geometrically bounded if >H < bH and >L < bL.I f>H > bH and
>L < bL then the tail index is (# + B)/(>H  bH);i f>H < bH and >L > bL then it is














One can use the recursions for qH,n and qL,n to set up recursions for BH,n and BL,n.


















When the two tail indices are not the same, this implies jn = >LqL,n/bL or jn =
>HqH,n/bH for all but ﬁnitely many n, and from this the proposition follows.
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6.1 Preliminaries
Suppose {Xi,Y i}k
i=1 are 2k independent random variables with Pr[Xi = n]=( 1 )n31,
n 5 N, Pr[Yi =0 ]=w,a n dPr[Yi =1 ]=1 w.D e ﬁ n e Zk =
Sk




As can be veriﬁed using moment generating functions, the sum of i.i.d. geometrically















for all m 5 N and n +1 m 5 N. In view of the independence assumptions,
































for all n 5 N. The complementary probability is Pr[Zk =0 ]=w
k since Zk =0if and
only if all Yi are zero.
Now suppose that K is drawn from the geometric distribution (1  j)jk31,k5 N.

































for all N 5 N.F o rN =1this yields Pr[Zk =0 ]=( 1 j)w/(1  jw).
6.2 Sketch of Proof and Computation
Suppose B =0 . Consider a ﬁrm that starts out with one blueprint. As reported in
Klette and Kortum [2004], by age a such a ﬁrm will have exited with probability s0(a)=
41b
>(a). Conditional on survival, its size distribution is the geometric size distribution
sn(a)/[1  s0(a)] = [1  (a)]n31(a). This can be veriﬁed directly by checking (38)-
(39). The size distribution at age a of a ﬁrm that starts out with k blueprints is simply
the distribution of the aggregate of k independent ﬁrms that start with one blueprint.
Applying (53) gives {Tn,k(a)}"
n=1 for the case B =0 .N o w s u p p o s e B > 0. Transitions
from the ﬁrst to the second phase occur at a rate B, as long as no exit has taken place.
This means that only a fraction e3Ba of surviving ﬁrms remain in the initial phase.
This determines {Tn,k(a)}"
n=1.T h e f o r m u l a s f o r T31,k(a) and T0,k(a) then follow from
integrating (37)-(38), as described in the text.
The inﬁnite sums needed in (40) and (41) follow from (54) and (55). Age densities
(distributions) can then be computed using a univariate (bivariate) numerical integra-
tion.
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